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JUDICIAL SELECTION
The importance of establishing methods of judicial selection that
will be most conducive to the maintenance of a thoroughly qualified and
independent judiciary and that will take the state judges out of politics
as nearly as may be, is generally recognized.
The method of selecting judges now used in Wisconsin is by direct
nonpartisan election. The original constitutional provision for selection
of judges in Wisconsin provided for election with no prohibition as to
partisan campaigning. Thus although the present provision for nonpartisan elections has made judicial candidates free from party influences it still necessitates a campaign in which political support is required even though nonpartisan.
Article VII in the Wisconsin Constitution which provides for the
election of judges, was by no means unanimously approved and passed.
The Committee for the formation of the mode of selecting judges was
appointed on October 8, 18461. After several months in Committee the
article was submitted to the Wisconsin Constitutional Convention for
consideration and adoption. Several motions were made to amend the
proposed article to incorporate a provision for the appointment of
judges, rather than for the election of judges; but they were all voted
down after spirited debate and the article as it stood was submitted and
passed on December 2, 18462.
The fact that the mode of selecting judges was controversial is evidenced by the language used in the Majority Report of the Committee
on the Method of Selection of Judges, of the Wisconsin Constitutional
Convention. The Committee said in its report:
"But there is one feature in the judicial system proposed for
adoption by the majority of the Committee, so prominent and
important, and upon which so decided a difference of opinion
exists, that it demands a more minute and extended examination. It is the election of judges by the people. This principle lies
at the foundation of the whole superstructure, and it is of the
first importance to ascertain whether it is sound and correct."3
The reason for the prominence and importance of the mode of selection of judges was the fact that the traditional mode of selection of
judges, appointment by the executive, began to be abandoned in many
states during this period when the impact of the Jacksonian democracy
provoked a conflict "over what was variously called the 'independence'
I Journal of the Convention, 1846, p. 24.
Journal of the Convention, 1846, p. 378.
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or 'irresponsibility' of the judiciary," and resulted in most states in a
shift to popular, partisan election of judges.4
The Majority Committee before arguing the relative merits of any
system of selecting judges first set up the requirements for a good judiciary which are as follows,
"to render any judicial system popular and highly useful, it must
secure the services of the best men for judges, it must administer
justice without delay and as nearly as may be at every man's
door."5
This definition although laid down in 1846 appears as sound today as
it did when it was propounded. The Committee then further laid down
a definition of a good judge which as as follows,
"He alone can be a popular judge who is honest, impartial,
decided and fearless, who holds with a steady hand the scales
of justice and will suffer no improper influence to approach
them, whose judgment, though it may sometimes waver and
tremble in doubt, ultimately
points steadily to the pole of eternal
6
truth and justice."
Again, the definition set down by the Committee appears as sound today as it did when it was written in 1846.
After setting up the requirements for a good judiciary and individual judges, the Majority argued for the establishment of a mode of
selecting judges based on election by the voters of the state. A reason
given for abandoning the traditional mode of selecting judges, that of
appointment, was that party spirit and improper influences would have
less scope for exercise in the election, than in the appointment of judges;
and that the people would be more attached to a system so democratic
in principle, and would more cheerfully acquiesce in the decisions of a
court selected by themselves. Further, the Committee thought that the
election of judges to administer the laws in the high tribunals of the
state, who would sit in judgment on the rights, the lives and liberties of
each elector, on a day expressly set apart for that single object, is an
act too solemn to admit of undue bias from the heat of partisan feeling,
or the efforts of demagogues. 8 These arguments used by the Majority
are the weak points of the report which favored the adoption of election
of judges. The Majority report closed with the statement that selection
of judges by election is not a novel scheme now for the first time sought
to be engrafted into constitutional law, and that it has been successfully
tried to its full extent in the state of Mississippi, and partially in Michigan, and in other statesY Thus it would seem, Wisconsin now has the
5 Journal of the Convention, 1846, p. 107.
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direct election mode for selecting judges as a result of a temporary and
popular political philosophy which had as its roots the political doctrine
of rotation in office, which was commonly expressed in the slogan, "To
the victor belongs the spoils."
A person might well ask, Why change from direct election to appointment of judges? The answer is that direct election of judges is
not desirable. There are many arguments to be made in favor of this
position. More forceful than any argument, perhaps, is the fact that a
survey made by the Special Committee on Judicial Selection and Tenure
of 1938 disclosed that in the ten states where most judges were not
selected by popular election, the courts were able and respected by the
bar and the people and all attempts to substitute the elective method
had been rebuffed, whereas in eighteen states movements were or had
been under way to substitute some other method for direct election and
in all but six of the remaining twenty states, dissatisfaction with the
courts and with the administration of justice had been expressed. In
the thirteen years since then, the movement for substitution of some
type of an appointive system for direct election has gathered momentum, while there still has been little or no demand for change in the
states employing an appointive system.10
The chief reason for rejecting the theory of direct election of judges
is that it puts the judiciary into politics. As Judge Henry T. Lummus
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has said:
"There is no harm in turning a politician into a judge. He
may become a good judge. The curse of the elective system is
that it turns almost every elective judge into a politician.""'
Judges should not be selected for partisan or political considerations.
A candidate for a legislative or executive office may run on the basis of
his advocacy of particular policies; a judge can have no "policy" other
than his ability to administer the law honestly and competently. Judges
should not be influenced by political alliances or political debts.
Good judges may be elected by popular ballot, but bad ones often
are; the general public in the nature of things cannot be adequately informed as to whether a candidate is a man of personal integrity,
whether he has adequate legal training and judicial temperament, and
too often the race goes to the man who has secured the greatest degree
of personal publicity or notoriety rather than to the best judicial timber.
A picture on a telegraph pole does not convey adequate information as
to qualification for judicial office. Indeed, considerations of financial return aside, the best men often will not become candidates because of
10 Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration, Edited by Arthur T. Vanderbilt. Law Center of New York University Pres. Ch. 1.

11 The Improvement of the Administration of Justice, (A Handbook prepared by

the Section of Judicial Administration, of the A. B. A.) p. 77.
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the distastefulness of making a political campaign for a judgeship, and
if they did run would often have no chance of success in a political
contest. Once on the bench, also, the judge should be free to make his
decisions in accordance with the law and the facts as he sees them; he
should not forever have to trim his sails lest he incur the opposition of
some powerful force which might turn him out at the next election.
Selection of candidates by party leaders in partisan elections does
not obviate any of these objections, although it is at least possible for
abler judges to be chosen in this manner.
It may be objected that democracy demands direct election of judicial officers; that an appointive system will result in a conservative or
reactionary bench; that the bar, a conservative force at best, will exert
undue influence in procuring appointments. The first of these arguments
has been pretty well exploded. There is nothing in the concept of
democracy that requires direct intervention by the voters in every aspect
of government; and in practice the voter either takes the candidate
offered him by the political leaders, or-under the direct primarychooses, if he votes at all, on the basis of insufficient knowledge or
cheap publicity. The argument as to the influence of the bar, whether
valid or not, is met by the mechanics of the A. B. A. Plan, which provides for appointment from a list of men selected by an agency composed of laymen and judicial officers.
For some time in the past and at the present time the American Bar
Association has been formulating and advocating changes in the Legal
System of our Country which are aimed at making our system as economical, efficient and just as possible. After an exhaustive and thorough study and appraisal of the methods used in selecting judges, the
American Bar Association adopted in 1937 a method of selection which
it recommends as the most efficient and acceptable sustitute available
for the direct election of judges. This method of selection which is
called the A. B. A.Plan is as follows:
(a) The filling of vacancies by appointment by the executive or other elective official or officials, but from a list named by
another agency, composed in part of high judicial officers and
in part of other citizens, selected for the purpose, who hold no
other public office.
(b) If further check upon appointment be desired, such
check may be supplied by the requirement of confirmation by the
State Senate or other legislative body of appointments made
through the dual agency suggested.
(c) The appointee after a period of service should be eligible for reappointment periodically thereafter, or periodically go
before the people upon his record, with no opposing candidate,
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the people voting up the question, "Shall Judge Blank be retained in office ?"The main features of the plan as quoted above are (1) appointment
by the Governor from a list submitted by a nominating committee, the
nominating and appointing authority being divided between two agencies; (2) periodic submission to the electorate with no opposing candidate, or "running against the record."
1. Dual nominating and appointing agency.. If judges are not to
be elected they must be appointed. Election by the legislature works
fairly well in those few states employing it but is not likely to be
adopted elsewhere. Appointment by the Chief Justice is not desirable.
In most states the appointing power will be vested in the Governor.
In order to secure the best choice of names, the executive should not
have an unlimited power of selection, but should be confined to a panel
of names chosen by a separate nominating agency. The use of two
agencies will diminish the opportunity for control of selection by special
interests, individuals or groups; it will provide checks and safeguards
against hasty or ill-considered action; it will insure a careful screening
of possible candidates; and it has the very practical advantage of making the plan more acceptable to the electorate. For this latter reason,
also, the nominating body should not be composed solely of lawyers and
judges. The bar has a tendency to feel that only lawyers are capable of
selecting the best judges. This is not true, and the lay public is not likely
to agree. The nominating body should consist equally, if not predominantly, of laymen elected by the voters or appointed by the Governor,
and serving without pay. If the state has a judicial council meeting
these qualifications it may well serve as the nominating agency. Nomination by a body of this sort, composed of high caliber men, should not
only produce better judges but also remove any likelihood of improper
motivation in their selection.
2. Periodic reappointment or reelection. The general public is not
ready to accept a life tenure system as to state court judges and it may
be doubted whether such tenure would be desirable. Greater security
of tenure than exists under the elective systm in most states is, however, essential to improvement of the caliber of judges. The ideal solution is to provide that, after a specified period of service, and periodically thereafter, the appointee should either come up for reappointment
or should go before the people at a general election on the basis of his
record and with no opposing candidate. The latter alternative is probably preferable, especially since it retains for the voters an opportunity
to participate in the process of judicial selection in about the only way
in which they can effectively do so. The able judge has little to fear
= Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration, p.3.
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from such a system, while it does permit removal of a judge whom
experience has shown to be plainly unqualified or who has become unfit to continue on the bench.
3. Legislative confirmation. Under the A. B. A. Plan it is optional
whether or not to include a provision for confirmation of appointments
by the legislature. Inclusion of such a provision may be thought necessary in order to obtain adoption of the plan. However, this has several
undesirable features. In most states the legislature is in session only for
a few months every two years, so that insecure interim appointments
must be made if vacancies are to filled as they occur. Too, subjection of
judicial appointments to legislative confirmation opens the door to
political deals and log-rolling.
Thus while appointment to judicial office rests with the executive
originally, his discretion is limited, and the appointee at the end of a
certain term may be retained or discharged by the people. Although final
control rests with the people, the difficulties interposed by party politics
and inherent in direct nomination and popular election are obviated.
At the present time in Wisconsin a movement is under way to have
adopted the A. B. A. Plan for the selection of judges. This movement
is supported by the Milwaukee Bar Association and many judges and
members of the state bar and laymen who are interested in having in
Wisconsin the best possible legal system and the ablest and best qualified men administering the law under that system. A bill embodying the
A. B. A. Plan has been drafted and will be submitted in the near future
to the legislature of Wisconsin for its consideration in the hope that a
joint resolution will be passed putting the matter of constitutional
amendment before the people. If a joint resolution is passed it will be
the duty of the bar to inform the public of the relative merits of the
direct elective method and the A. B. A. Plan so that the issue thus
raised will receive the benefit of intelligent voting.
EMIL SEBETIC

